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Abstract Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative
hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward.
This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distin-
guishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread
confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings
concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypoth-
esis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that cre-
ative hypothesis formation is guided rather than blind, integrating developments from
contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility argu-
ments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided
variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility
arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, concep-
tual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner
not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis
formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but
about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms.
Keywords Darwinism · Blind variation · Creativity · Hypothesis formation · Guided
variation · Lamarckism · Evolutionary epistemology · Popper · Campbell · Simonton
Popper (1972, 1974a,b, 1975, 1984) and Campbell (1960, 1974a,b) both claimed that
creative hypothesis formation shares a fundamental feature with biological evolution:
it is based on ‘blind’ variation. This analogy has caused a lot of confusion and critique.
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What does ‘blind’ mean and, considering its definition, is that the way we produce new
ideas in science? And if we do produce new ideas blindly, does the analogy between
hypothesis formation and biological evolution add something to our knowledge of how
new hypotheses arise in the minds of scientists?—These are the two main questions
this paper aims to address with respect to the blind-variation analogy, the analogy
between creative hypothesis formation and novelty in biological evolution.
I am only concerned with this particular analogy. Other analogies between
science (or culture) and evolutionary biology might well be valuable even if the blind-
variation analogy is ill-founded. Whether these other analogies make sense cannot be
addressed here. Notable analogies are for instance Hull’s (1988, 2001) evolutionary
model of science, focusing on the evolutionary concept of fitness, to illuminate com-
petition and cooperation in science, or models of cultural evolution, using quantitative
population-based models to study gene-culture interaction and to illuminate similar-
ities and differences in the inheritance patterns of culture and biological evolution.1
Both these evolutionary approaches are not only independent of the blind-variation
analogy; representatives of these models are themselves among the critics of this spe-
cific analogy.2 Finally, this paper looks exclusively at scientific creativity. Many of
the points that will be mentioned could certainly also be made for art or other cultural
domains, but to show this has to wait for another occasion.
In Part 1, I shall propose three distinctive meanings of the concept of blind var-
iation, i.e. three ways how the blind-variation analogy can be made precise. I shall
then introduce and develop the critics’ point of view in Part 2, which is that creative
hypothesis formation is guided rather than blind. In Part 3, I shall discuss and assess
three compatibility arguments. These say that the critique of guided variation can be
made compatible with the view that there exists an important analogy in terms of the
blindness of variation between creative hypothesis formation and biological evolution.
By revisiting the debate in this manner, I aim to provide a new and systematic
discussion of the arguments used for and against the claim that creative hypothesis
formation is blind. But by systematically discussing the issue in the described manner,
I also aim to introduce a new meta-level to the long-lasting back and forth in the debate,
a level at which we can address what follows from the critique of guided variation for
the ‘blind variation’ analogy with respect to hypothesis formation. Towards this end,
the paper integrates contemporary developments in philosophy and psychology of cre-
ativity, a body of literature by and large ignored by philosophers of science. Integrating
these developments allows us to see that important matters of fact are actually clear
and accepted by both sides; only the interpretation varies. To a considerable degree
the debate is only about whether the use of the concept of blind variation, taken from
evolutionary biology, is justified or not, given the factual basis accepted by both sides
1 Advocated by Boyd and Richerson (1985), Richerson and Boyd (2005), and others (e.g. Mesoudi et al.
2006).
2 See Hull (2001, pp. 513–514) for critique of blind variation and matters of independence; Boyd and
Richerson (1985, pp. 81–98) already distanced themselves from ‘blind’ variation; see Mesoudi (2008) for
the most recent account of the independence of cultural evolution from the blind variation analogy. If I
understand him correctly, he defends this via (what I call here) ‘selectionist compatibility’ and ‘bias com-
patibility.’ He is more focused on cultural evolution and concentrates thus on the outcome of cognitive
processes (and their optimality) and less on how creative outcomes are cognitively produced.
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of the debate. Distinguishing clearly between different meanings of blind variation
will prove to be crucial in order to untangle the factual from the conceptual issue. If
these distinctions, instead of the metaphorical term ‘blind’ were used, it would have
been recognized easily that the debate is characterised by ‘much ado about almost
nothing’, i.e. about a claim few would dare to put into question.
1 Three meanings of ‘blind’ and the critique of guided variation
In Campbell’s terminology, to which Popper has referred as well, biological
evolution and creative hypothesis formation are both instances of a so-called “blind-
variation-selective-retention-process.” When applied to creative hypothesis formation,
‘variation’ stands for the process of generating novelty, meaning the modification or
creation of hypotheses. ‘Selective retention’ stands for cognitive intentional selection
of the generated items: after generating hypotheses, we select them, we decide to keep
or to discard them. The meaning of the term ‘blind’ is less clear. A complete historical
review of Popper’s and Campbell’s usage of the term would by far exceed the space
available here. My aim is not historical exegesis; I shall follow a more systematic road.
1.1 The concept of blind variation in evolutionary biology
To evaluate an analogy the base of the analogy must be clear and defined indepen-
dently of the analogy itself. Otherwise the definition of the concept that is building the
heart of the analogy, and is supposed to apply to the base and the target of the anal-
ogy, is in danger of being manufactured so that the analogy works, i.e. in a question-
begging manner. The only approach that prevents a question-begging definition of
blind variation is to use the biologists own concept of blindness, and to check on this
basis whether the target of the analogy (creative hypothesis formation) matches onto
the biological base.
In evolutionary biology, as it developed from Darwin until today, the term ‘blind
variation’ refers to the claim that new variants occur in an undirected manner. A new
variant occurs undirected, if it occurs randomly with respect to its adaptivity. As the
biologist Futuyma (1998) puts it, variation or “mutation is random in the sense that
the chance that a particular mutation will occur is not influenced by whether or not
the organism is in an environment in which that mutation would be advantageous”
(Futuyma 1998, p. 282; emph. in the orig.). In formal terms, as philosopher Sober
(1992, p. 39) puts it: “Let u be the probability of mutating from A to a and v be the
probability of mutating from a to A. Mutation is directed if (i) u > v and (ii) u > v
because w(a) > w(A), where w(X) is the fitness of X.” If that is not the case, the muta-
tion is undirected. In such a case variation and selection are “decoupled,” as Toulmin
(1972, p. 338) has put it. Decoupling means that the two “twin sub-processes of vari-
ation and selection […] take place quite independently, so that the factors responsible
for the selective perpetuation of variants are entirely unrelated to those responsible for
the original generation of those same variants” (Toulmin 1972, p. 337). If the chance
of the occurrence of a new variant is not influenced by the factors that determine
the selection of the variant, then variation and selection are decoupled and the change
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undirected. Given this definition, directedness is a matter of degree, whereas
undirectedness is simply the absence or negation of any directedness and thus
(logically) not a matter of degree.
Three further points about this concept of undirectedness have to be taken into
account to prevent widespread misunderstandings surrounding the idea of undirected
and directed variation. First, directed changes are often called ‘Lamarckian.’
Lamarck’s concept of directedness, however, was stronger. Lamarck assumed that new
characteristics arising in an organism are directed in the sense that the factors causing
new characteristics determine the course of evolution without any selection process that
weeds out non-adaptive features. With respect to adaptive evolution, Lamarck assumed
a factor that automatically produces adaptive features in organisms, a factor that
induces adaptive features. In terms of the concept of coupling, Lamarck’s concept
of directedness would mean that the coupling is 100 per cent: that the productive fac-
tors are the selective factors, that u=1 and u=1 because of w(a) > w(A). A system
with total coupling would make selection superfluous. But as long as coupling of pro-
ductive and selective factors is not 100 per cent, the change can still be a Darwinian
selection process, even though the process would not rely on undirected changes as
defined above. This shows that a partial coupling is compatible with Darwinism in a
wide sense, i.e. with any theory that assumes that a sorting process (selection or drift)
is a necessary part of biological evolution. Undirectedness is thus not a necessary
ingredient of Darwinism in that wide sense.3 Yet, undirected variation is still funda-
mental to contemporary Darwinism (what I shall call Darwinism in the narrow sense),
i.e. the Darwinism you find in a standard textbook version of contemporary evolu-
tionary biology, such as in Futuyma (1998). And the reason why it is fundamental to
contemporary Darwinism in this narrow sense (i.e. Modern Synthesis Darwinism) is
simply: there is broad consensus that undirectedness holds for biological evolution.4
Second, undirectedness does not mean randomness in the sense that all mutations or
variants are equally likely. Although mutation is stochastic, there is no equiprobability
of specific mutations, even though they occur in an undirected manner. Different loci
or regions of loci in a genome have different mutation rates. Environmental factors,
such as ultraviolet radiation, chemical mutagens, or nutrition can increase the muta-
tion rate at a certain loci. There is also the phenomenon of mutation pressure where
the forward mutation rate at a locus is different from the backward mutation rate.
Consequently, undirected variation has to be distinguished from random variation in
3 See Kronfeldner (2007, pp. 499–500) for a more detailed account of the compatibility of directed variation
with Darwinism in this wide sense. According to this account, Darwin was a Darwinist in this wide sense
since he partly relied on directed variation.
4 See Sniegowski and Lenski (1995) for a detailed account of this Modern Synthesis consensus, still
accommodating seemingly ‘directed/adaptive mutations’ (e.g. due to environmental stress) by alternative
explanations along the lines of the consensus. It should nonetheless be mentioned that the Modern Synthesis
view is currently under severe attack. As I understand it, this attack from ecological and developmental
perspectives targets the gene selectionism inscribed in it, regarding the gene as the sole locus of evolutionary
change and heredity. Even if a move away from gene centrism would include directed phenotypic variation
as a factor in biological evolution, this does not challenge the proposition that mutations are undirected,
and it would certainly not change the concept of undirectedness. According to this, the modern synthesis
would have to be extended but not changed.
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the sense of equiprobability of trials. To stress this is important since the two have
often been confused. A statement from Campbell illustrates this point. To say that
blind variation means that “specific correct trials are no more likely to occur at any
one point in a series of trials than another, nor than specific incorrect trials” (Campbell
1960, p. 93) is misleading, since it suggests that undirected variation requires that
specific adaptive trials are as likely as specific maladaptive ones, i.e. that they are
equiprobable.5 Recall, mutation is undirected if it is not the case that (i) u > v and
(ii) u > v because w(a) > w(A), where w(X) is the fitness of X. This definition states
that if there is a higher probability of u, it must be excluded that this is because of
a higher fitness of the allele ‘a’ compared to the allele ‘A’. It does not follow that
we have directed variation, if u > v. If a specific adaptive trial is more likely than any
other trial this is not necessarily a case of directed variation. Therefore, it is not the
case that undirected variation requires that specific adaptive trials are no more likely
to occur than specific maladaptive ones. In summary: no equiprobability is required
for undirected variation, and if there is a higher probability of some variants, it is not
necessarily due to coupling, i.e. due to the influence of the selective environment of
this variant.
Last but not least, directed variation has to be distinguished from developmental
constraints, which can also lead to a higher probability of some variants. At a certain
point of time in evolution, certain variants are not possible or at least very unlikely.
The reason for this is that if the respective developmental pathways were missing,
an occurring mutation would not lead to a viable variant. A common example is the
effect of a half-wing, which prevents the future appearance of an arm in place of a
wing. The half-wing acts as a developmental constraint. Thus, it is not the case that at
each point in time every conceivable phenotypic variation can occur for selection to
operate on. This limit on the range of variation, a statistical bias in variation, which is
exhibited by biological evolution, is compatible with Darwinism—even in its narrow
sense, in sharp contrast to coupling. Developmental constraints are part of standard
evolutionary biology, even if they diminish the explanatory force of the selective part
of the overall evolutionary process.6 Conceptually, developmental constraints can be
distinguished from coupling in the following way: first of all, developmental con-
straints do not influence the occurrence of mutations or re-combinations. In principle,
they could, but as far as I know, they are not proven to do so. They merely influence
whether a mutation can be expressed and whether the change, if expressed, will have a
positive effect on the fitness of the organism. Second, and more important here, devel-
opmental constraints are (if at all) the effects of past selective environments. Coupling
is different in both respects: first, coupling would make adaptive variation more likely
to occur in the first place, i.e. at the genotypic level. Second, coupling would not be an
effect of previous selection. On the contrary, it would be a direct effect of the current
selective environment. This difference is often overlooked, since both—developmental
5 A similar misleading formulation occurs, for instance, in Mesoudi (2008, pp. 244, 252), despite the other
merits of that paper.
6 See Dawkins (1986, pp. 307–312), Amundson (1989), or Futuyma (1998, p. 276) on this particular
issue.
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constraints and directed variation due to coupling—lead to a statistical bias in varia-
tion. To remember the difference will prove to be decisive in Part 2.
1.2 Application to creative hypothesis formation
If we now transfer all this to creative hypothesis formation, then the following holds:
creative hypothesis formation is blind, in the sense of an undirected change in ideas, if
the change is decoupled, i.e. if the occurrence of new ideas is not influenced by factors
that determine the selection of these new ideas.
Again, variants do not have to be produced at random in order to be undirected.
This is not required for biological evolution either. In principle, we are certainly free
to define blind variation differently, e.g. as requiring random variation; but it is impor-
tant to distinguish such an interpretation of ‘blind variation’ clearly from undirected
variation.7 And it is even more important to note that we would then ignore the base
of the putative analogy.
Whereas randomness is a stronger requirement than undirectedness, there is also a
third interpretation of blind variation that does not even demand undirectedness. As
a reaction to complaints that his concept of blind variation offered earlier is unclear,
Campbell (1974b) stated that for him blind means “unjustified”: hypotheses are trials,
and that means that they are unjustified by origin, i.e. they are not directly caused
or warranted by their origin in observation. Blind-as-unjustified variation means that
we do not know in advance whether the ideas we produce are worthwhile. This does
not exclude a partial coupling, since a partial coupling can still lead to variants that
are not worthwhile. Popper also referred to this concept of blind-as-unjustified varia-
tion. A main goal of his evolutionary epistemology was to argue against what he called
observationism or the bucket theory of the mind, which assumes that the ideas we come
up with are—in principle—warranted by their origin in observational sense data. For
Popper, this idea is tantamount to Lamarck’s idea of an environment inducing adaptive
changes in organisms without the help of selection.
How, and if at all, beliefs can get their epistemological warrant, if not by their
origin, is an epistemological question that is irrelevant for this study.8 Consequently,
whether the term ‘unjustified’ is useful or whether we should, given the problem of
induction and related problems, get rid of such terms is irrelevant here as well. The
important thing for this study is that we clearly see the difference between unjusti-
fied, undirected, and random variation. Unjustified variation refers to the fact that we
come up with ideas concerning which we do not know in advance whether they are
worthwhile.
If we try to find an analogue to this concept of blind-as-unjustified variation in the
biological realm, it would amount to a denial of a Lamarckian 100% coupling. We
7 Kim (2001, pp. 109, 113), for instance, uses blind variation as random variation vis-à-vis and undistin-
guished from other meanings. Others, however, did acknowledge the distinction: Popper did (e.g. 1974a,
p. 117; 1974b, p. 35), and so did Blute (1979, pp. 44–45), and Campbell in various places (Campbell 1960,
p. 92; 1974a, p. 56; 1974b, p. 148), despite the confusing remark mentioned above.
8 Campbell, for instance, argued for a more constructivist warrant of knowledge. See the papers in Heyes
and Hull (2001).
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would then have to count everything as ‘blind’ that is not caused in a Lamarckian
inductive manner. Cases of partial coupling, i.e. cases of directed variation, are then
still cases of ‘blind variation,’ and blindness becomes a matter of degree. This stands
in sharp contrast to the biologist’s definition of blindness as undirectedness, which
restricts ‘blind variation’ to the absence of any coupling. This contrast points to an
important difference in perspective. The two interpretations of the qualifier ‘blind’,
undirected and unjustified, relate to two opposed partitions of the continuum from
zero to 100% coupling. The concept of undirected variation treats zero coupling as
the lonely member of one class and puts everything else in a second class of direct-
edness; the concept of unjustified variation puts 100% coupling in an isolation camp
and everything else into the crowded blindness camp.9
To make this change of perspective explicit, and to decide for one partitioning, is of
utmost importance in order to find a straight way out of the back-and-forth of the debate
and to prevent falling back into the metaphorical language of being ‘blind’. Since it is
equally important to use a non-question begging point of view, the biologist’s concept
of blindness is, all things considered, the safer route.
Let me briefly outline the consequences of this terminological decision. If we con-
centrate on creative hypothesis formation, the concept of unjustified variation counts all
cases of hypothesis formation as ‘blind’, in which we do not know in advance whether
the trial-ideas will prove worthwhile. The concept of undirected variation, the one
used by biologists, would however exclude most of these cases as being ‘blind’. As
illustrated at the beginning of this Sect. 1.2, if we transfer the concept of undirected
variation, then creative hypothesis formation is blind only if the change is decoupled,
i.e., if the occurrence of new ideas is not influenced by factors that determine the selec-
tion of these new ideas. If there is coupling between producing and selecting factors
in the formation of an idea, the generation of the idea is not undirected and therefore
not ‘blind’ (given the biologist’s definition of blind variation), even though the crea-
tor might not know in advance whether the idea is worthwhile, i.e., even though the
generation of the idea might well be a case of unjustified variation.
2 Guided variation
The proposal that creative hypothesis formation is blind (in the biologist’s meaning
of the term) has been objected to repeatedly. According to critics, creative hypoth-
esis formation is directed, or guided, as most prefer to say in the case of cognition.
It is directed since variants that are useful are more likely to occur because they are
thought to be useful as a solution to a given problem.10 What critics have usually
left unexplained is how exactly the orientation towards a problem leads to an adaptive
bias, and whether all cases of creative hypothesis formation include such an orientation
9 I want to thank one of the anonymous referees of this paper particularly. By proposing an alternative defi-
nition of undirectedness, he helped me, precisely because of his divergent perspective, to see the importance
of this point.
10 See Ruse (1974), Richards (1977), Skagestad (1978), Thagard (1988), Amundson (1989), Sternberg
(1998), and Dasgupta (2004), to name but a few. A similar critique, but not focused on the cognitive level,
can be found in Boyd and Richerson (1985, pp. 81–98).
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towards a problem. In the following, I shall summarize the critique and the evidence
used for it, and develop the critics’ point of view in the direction of an answer to the
latter two questions.
2.1 Guided variation in creative hypothesis formation
The critique of guided variation in hypothesis formation rests on two kinds of evidence:
first, historical cases as paradigm examples of creativity, and, second, more direct and
general evidence from cognitive psychology, which systematically studies the cogni-
tive processes involved in hypothesis formation and other creative cognition. I shall
argue that the two kinds of evidence support each other.
Before I do this, a third kind of evidence needs to be mentioned. It is used by those
critics that focus on diffusion of ideas and analyze cultural change as a population-
level evolutionary process. Boyd and Richerson (1985, pp. 81–98), for instance, have
claimed that cognition is guided by various criteria (i.e., cognitive and other biases)
and that therefore the outcome of a cognitive process is usually directed. What is then
fed into the populational process can be already biased towards adaptivity and can thus
increase the probability that adaptive items spread at the populational level via social
learning. As I have argued elsewhere in more detail (Kronfeldner 2007, pp. 507–09),
this critique does not address guided variation directly at the cognitive level and is thus
compatible with the claim that the cognitive process reaches the ‘guided variation’ that
is fed into the population by a truly undirected variation and selection process at the
cognitive level. Adaptivity at the end of the cognitive process will thus not provide
evidence that helps to solve the debate about creativity of individual people, a debate
that can only be solved by focusing on the cognitive level and how individuals arrive
at the ideas that are then fed into the public domain of shared knowledge.11
The claim of those critics that focus on the cognitive level is that through the orien-
tation towards a certain problem, certain knowledge gets activated, and this knowledge
structures the search space for solutions and, finally, triggers the production of certain
ideas and not others. Completely strange hypotheses are not generated at all; on the
contrary, usually ‘good guesses’ are generated. My claim is that the guidedness that is
apparent in these good guesses is due to cognitive coupling: part of the selective envi-
ronment (already acquired knowledge) influences the production of the new thought
trials.
2.2 A historical illustration
Take one of the many well-known cases from history of science as an illustration,
e.g. Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of the benzene molecule. Given our historical
evidence of Kekulé’s career and what we know about how he arrived at the hypothesis
for the structure of the benzene molecule, it is clear that Kekulé’s general knowledge
about chemistry and his knowledge that benzene has this and that chemical features
11 See Mesoudi (2008) who further discusses the precise nature of guided variation at the level of cultural
evolution and how it even directs biological evolution via niche construction.
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(derived from earlier rounds of hypothesis formation and selection) played a decisive
role in the production of the hypothesis that benzene forms a ring. The discovery was
not instantaneous and not independent of the knowledge he acquired before.12 On
the contrary, the knowledge enabled some ideas and not others. After producing the
hypothesis, it was evaluated. And most important here, it was done so with the help
of the same cluster of knowledge, which helped produce the new hypothesis, namely,
knowledge about chemistry and chemical features. Because of this cognitive coupling
between generating and selecting factors, i.e., because of the influence of already
acquired knowledge, the hypothesis about the structure of the benzene molecule has
to be counted as being generated in a directed manner.
Nonetheless, the influence of already acquired knowledge in such cases is still
“plastic,” as Briskman (1981, p. 148), defender of the Darwinian account of creativity,
suggests, since the already acquired pieces of knowledge “may themselves have to be
modified” to reach a viable hypothesis. In addition, and quite important for this study:
other factors, factors that are not yet part of previously acquired knowledge, also play
a part in the occurrence (as well as the selection) of novel ideas.
If we take Kekulé’s case to represent the standard case of creative problem solving,
then three points have to be acknowledged: that guidedness (but not blindness) is a
matter of degree, that hypotheses are not generated in an undirected manner, and that
the already acquired knowledge alone does not explain what happens in the mind of
creative problem solvers. After illustrating these three points in a row, I will justify
why I believe that Kekulé can count as an example for how creativity usually works,
even though we do not know what really happened in his mind.
Partial coupling in hypothesis formation shows that guidedness is a matter of degree,
i.e. there can be more or less directedness. But note that the same does not hold for
undirectedness: there cannot be more or less blindness in the sense of undirectedness,
since undirectedness is defined as the absence of any coupling. This is often ignored
(e.g. when defenders of blind hypothesis formation want to save the blind variation
analogy by reference to ‘degrees of blindness’) (e.g. Simonton 1999a, p. 62; 2005,
pp. 300–301). Either a process is undirected, or it is more or less directed. What
defenders of the blind variation analogy say (i.e., that there are ‘degrees of blindness’)
is wrong, but what they want to say (i.e., that constraints do not equal total coupling
or foresight) is correct, as I shall concede in more detail in Part 3.
If formation and selection of a hypothesis is coupled, and if formation and selection
of biological variation is not coupled at all, which I take for granted here, then there
exists an important disanalogy to the case of biological evolution.
Finally, those factors involved in creative cognition that are not part of already
acquired knowledge can be regarded as coincidental. They are coincidental in the
sense that they were, prior to the hypothesis formation, not part of the knowledge
space defining the problem the scientist tries to solve (e.g. for Kekulé’s case, to find
a description for the structure of the benzene molecule). It is these factors, and the
12 See Findlay (1968, pp. 34–41) for a short survey on the historical case. See Schaffer (1994) for a lucid
critical discussion of the ‘anecdotes’ surrounding Kekulé’s dreams and imaginations, and for further ref-
erences for the historical case. See Kronfeldner (forthcoming) on a ‘demystified’ description of Kekulé’s
imaginations from the point of view of contemporary psychology of creativity.
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cognitive mechanism related to them, that are today often cited as explanation for the
distinctive spontaneity and surprise so often accompanying creative cognition. And,
important for this study, this spontaneity and surprise exists despite guidedness. Last
but not least, the explanation via coincidental factors is taken into account by crit-
ics as well as defenders of blind variation. The interpretation in Darwinian terms is
controversial: the Darwinian interprets the influence of these coincidental factors as
evidence for ‘blind variation’ and the non-Darwinian denies this. This already indi-
cates that much of the debate, as stated in the introduction, is not, at least not today,
about the available evidence on what happens in creative minds. It is about the inter-
pretation of the evidence in Darwinian terms. But before this can be defended, we
have to place the argument from guided variation on a more stable foundation.
2.3 Towards a more general account of guided variation
We do not know exactly what happened in Kekulé’s mind, and one or even a few histor-
ical examples might not suffice to make a convincing argument for guided variation,
as Simonton (2005), defending blind variation, stressed against Dasgupta (2004), who
offered three further historical cases along the line of the argument from guided vari-
ation. Yet a short review of the evidence coming from detailed comparative historical
studies, from experimental cognitive science, and from computer studies, supports the
assumption that Kekulé’s example represents a paradigm case of creative cognition.
The case-study based historical approach to creativity that compares paradigm indi-
vidual examples of creativity, occurring in the wilderness of real science, art, etc., is
despite its limitations still regarded as an ample supplier of data for understanding
creativity, especially since it is the only approach for which it is beyond doubt that
it studies truly creative people. This historical approach is probably best exemplified
by the work of Gruber (Gruber 1974; Gruber and Davies 1988; Gruber and Wallace
1999), and Gardner (1993). By careful comparative studies, on Darwin and others,
Gruber established that creativity in individuals gradually evolves over time and that
this involves the “loose coupling of the evolving sub-systems of knowledge, purpose,
and affect” (Gruber and Davies 1988, p. 265). Gardner’s extensive case studies also
confirm the importance of expert knowledge in creativity. For instance, it usually takes
a decade of ‘aspiration,’ of studying the accumulated and received knowledge of the
domain, before a ‘great man of history’ can celebrate his ‘coming out’ with an impor-
tant ‘inspiration.’ All this evidence from historical case studies supports the stance of
guided variation.
Another supplier of evidence is cognitive science, which tries to understand cre-
ativity ‘in the lab,’ in part with the help of computer models. Cognitive approaches
to creativity disagree on many detailed points.13 Yet, there seem to be two points
of convergence: firstly, in cases of problem solving, previously acquired knowledge
structures the search space so that ‘good guesses’ are more likely to occur, and, sec-
ondly, many cognitive mechanisms are involved in this.
13 See Runco (2007, pp. 1–38), Ward et al. (1999), or Sternberg (1988, 1998).
123
Synthese (2010) 175:193–218 203
It has been shown, for instance, that experts (i.e. those that have already acquired
a considerable amount of knowledge of a specific domain) usually show a higher per-
formance level than novices if they are presented with problems that demand a more
or less creative solution.14 And even defenders of blind variation admit that expertise
plays a structuring role in creative problem solving, as I will illustrate in Part 3.
Research on particular cognitive mechanisms points in the same direction. The cog-
nitive mechanisms currently debated with respect to creative cognition are numerous:
perception, visual imagery, associational linkage, conceptual combination, analogi-
cal reasoning, abstraction, use of metaphors, conceptual expansion, memory retrieval,
spreading activation, defocused attention, reduced latent inhibition, and opportunistic
assimilation, to name but a few. These multiple mechanisms are interacting in a com-
plex and highly efficient manner and at the moment of insight, the sudden ‘Eureka,’ at a
quite high speed, some of them on auto-pilot, i.e. without conscious monitoring. They
are held to explain not only creativity in the lab, but also the myriads of idiosyncratic
and unpredictable cases of real creativity in the wilderness of human endeavours, cases
that are considered as hard to bring under a general model, precisely because of the
sheer complexity of interaction of these mechanisms.15
None of these mechanisms has been proven to work in an undirected manner. They
all build on mental structures, i.e., already acquired knowledge, leading to a partial
coupling as described above for Kekulé’s case. For most of these cognitive mechanisms
(e.g. analogical reasoning) the influence of already acquired knowledge has never been
much in dispute; but some have been used explicitly for claiming that creative cogni-
tion is ‘blind.’ They have thus taken centre-stage within the debate. Simonton (2005,
pp. 302, 305, 306), for instance, refers to spreading activation, defocused attention,
and reduced latent inhibition as “blind,” while at the same time acknowledging that
this does not exclude the possibility that already acquired knowledge has a struc-
turing influence on these mechanisms. But as Schooler and Dougal (1999, p. 352)
note, spreading activation is “by no means random in nature. Rather, the direction
and extent of the spread of activation critically depends on (a) the specific items that
were initially activated and (b) the underlying structure of an individual’s knowledge
representation.” Seifert et al. (1995) show the same for the mechanism of opportu-
nistic assimilation, supporting thereby that ‘chance favours only the prepared mind.’
As Schooler and Dougal (1999, pp. 352–353) summarize: “just because creativity
can be fostered by random cues does not necessarily implicate randomness in the
psychological process of creativity.”16 To give a full account of all the experiments
and mechanisms currently discussed in creative cognition approaches, would by far
exceed the space available here. But what can be concluded from the short review of
the state of the art is: there is a convergence in cognitive studies of creativity towards
14 See Sternberg (1998, p. 163) for an overview of studies on expert-novice differences, in reply to the
Darwinian model of undirected variation.
15 See Sternberg (2006, p. 433), Boden (2004, pp. 260–276), and Ward et al. (1999, pp. 190–191); see
also Mumford (1999), Seifert et al. (1995), and Weisberg (1993). The accounts of these authors certainly
differ but these differences can safely be ignored here.
16 See Mumford (1999, p. 345) for the same argument with respect to associational linking and conceptual
combination.
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a multiple mechanisms view; most of these mechanisms also occur in normal cogni-
tion; their complex interaction helps to explain the characteristic surprise in creative
cognition; and, finally, even the most characteristic mechanisms of creative cognition,
such as opportunistic assimilation, show the guidedness postulated by critics of the
blind variation claim.
Research on computer models of creativity also points in the same direction. First,
even a generalist ‘creative computer program’ (i.e. EURISKO), not relying so much
on domain-specific expert knowledge, is equally working in a constrained manner.
“[C]onsiderable specialist knowledge has to be provided if it [the creative computer
program, MK] is not to generate hosts of nonsensical (as opposed to merely bor-
ing) ideas” (Boden 1998, p. 351).17 In addition, when we try to find a solution for
a certain problem, it seems that we are not working like genetic algorithms, which
are programs explicitly designed as Darwin machines, instantiating the undirected
variation-selection process found so effective in biological evolution, as Boden (1999,
pp. 366–369, 2004, pp. 318–322) summarizes this domain of research.18 Genetic algo-
rithms are “blatantly Darwinian,” as Simonton (1999b, p. 313) states correctly; yet
we seem not to be like genetic algorithms. If we were, this would be evidence for
undirected variation in cognition that would have strength comparable to the classical
experiments conducted in biology to validate the view that mutations are undirected.19
But even Simonton (1999b, p. 313), currently the hardest defender of the blind-varia-
tion claim within psychology of creativity, admits that other non-Darwinian computer
programs can equally model our creativity. Boden, defender of a connectionist model
of creativity, concludes from her account of computer creativity (be it classical, con-
nectionist, or evolutionary), that our creativity is based on generative structures that
constrain the production of ideas so that certain ideas are more likely to occur than
others, even though our mind often uses coincidental clues, as do many computer
programs. Note that this conclusion does not entail that genetic algorithms cannot be
creative, or that they are useless for understanding our creativity. On the contrary, they
help us to see differences between genetic algorithms and our minds; and this in turn
helps us to construct genetic algorithms that more closely model our creativity. For
instance, those genetic algorithms that are considerably constrained by expert knowl-
edge (e.g. by an “aesthetically structured space,” as is the genetic algorithm used by
the artist William Latham for a painting program) seem to do just that: they produce
less radical variants, but those that are produced can be the basis for incremental and
systematic development (Boden 2004, p. 320). And this is something we usually do
with our most creative ideas.
Even Simonton admits that guided variation is generally exhibited in cases of prob-
lem solving (e.g. Simonton 2003, pp. 316–317, 2005, pp. 300–301). This is a fur-
ther indication that it is not controversial anymore whether cases like Kekulé should
be described the way critics do, or whether we have reliable evidence for guided
17 In his critique of evolutionary epistemology, Thagard (1988) has claimed the same for his computer
model of creativity.
18 A classical work on genetic algorithms is: Holland (1975); Compare Koza (1992) and Fogel (1999).
19 See Luria and Delbrück (1943). For a review of the debates surrounding these experiments see Sniegowski
and Lenski (1995) .
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variation from history and cognitive science. What follows for the blind-variation
analogy (and the corresponding claim that creativity is analogous to biological evo-
lution) is controversial, and also, as part of this issue, whether there is any additional
evidence that allows us to make the evidence for guided variation irrelevant for the
analogy. These issues will be dealt with in Part 3. But before we can move on to this
part, a specific complication must be addressed.
There is one issue that still stands in the way of a general account of guided variation.
That the orientation towards a certain problem makes creative hypothesis formation
guided does not entail that all cases of creative hypothesis formation include such an
orientation. There might well be cases of true serendipity, cases of creative hypothesis
formation that are defined as not having an orientation towards a specific problem,
cases where you find something without even looking for it as a solution to a certain
problem (Roberts 1989). Alexander Fleming’s serendipitous discovery of penicillin is
a standard example of true serendipity in science. If one is not looking for a solution
to a specific problem, then the critique of guided variation, at least in the form intro-
duced above, cannot be applied in the same sense as it applies to Kekulé, a clear case
of problem-oriented hypothesis formation.
What does serendipity show? Not much, since cases of serendipitous hypothesis
formation are very likely also directed. If serendipitous findings can count at all as
hypothesis formations (instead of counting them as discoveries without prior hypoth-
esis formation), then the occurrence of the hypothesis at the moment of finding (e.g.
Fleming’s idea that this thing over there is a useful thing for this and that) is still
influenced by prior knowledge acquisition. And the prior knowledge might influence
the creative process in a way that makes the recognition of something as a useful
discovery (in our case the thing then called penicillin), and thus the formation of the
hypothesis, more likely. This only requires that serendipitous recognition counts as a
part of hypothesis formation and not as a part of hypothesis selection. What seren-
dipity then shows is that guided hypothesis formation is likely even without a prior
orientation towards a certain problem.
To summarize: in creative hypothesis formation (in standard problem-oriented cases
as well as in cases of serendipitous hypothesis formation, if there are any), the occur-
rence of hypotheses is directed. If, as is still believed to be the case and taken for
granted here, biological evolution is based on undirected variation, then there is an
important difference between creative hypothesis formation and biological evolution,
a difference that destroys the adequacy of the analogy between the two phenomena.20
3 Three compatibility arguments
The main answer to the critique of guided variation has always been that there is, none-
theless, an important and adequate analogy. Defenders of the blind variation claim do
not deny that hypothesis formation is guided by previously acquired knowledge, but
20 There might well be other differences between the base and the target of the analogy that would not
destroy the adequacy of the analogy. That creative hypothesis formation does not rely on sexual reproduc-
tion is, for instance, irrelevant for the adequacy of the analogy (or claim) that creative hypothesis formation
is as undirected as biological variation.
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they deny that this destroys the adequacy of the analogy between novelty in human
minds and novelty in biological evolution. The defensive claim is: it does not fol-
low from the apparent guidedness that creative hypothesis formation and biological
evolution are not analogous. Popper (1974b, p. 117 or 1975, pp. 84–87) already admit-
ted in 1974 that creativity is guided in the way critics claim, even though he sticks to
the claim that creativity is based on blind variation (and therefore similar to biological
evolution). The question that will be important for the rest of the paper is thus: what
follows from guided variation for the claim that creativity is similar to the Darwinian
process of undirected variation and consequent selection? It will prove to be decisive
that we clearly distinguished undirectedness from other meanings of blind variation,
and from developmental constraints.
To approach the issue in a systematic manner, I shall highlight three arguments that
state that guided variation is compatible with the thesis that creativity is analogous to
biological evolution. The first argument states (what I call) a selectionist compatibility,
the second a bias compatibility, and the third a hidden chaos compatibility.
3.1 Selectionist compatibility
The selectionist compatibility argument states that a bias within variation is compati-
ble with the Darwinian view of evolution as a selective process. Popper and Campbell
go in this direction. All that is required for a process to be a Darwinian evolutionary
one—and therefore parallel to biological evolution—is (a) the exclusion of foresight
in a narrow sense and (b) the exclusion of a Lamarckian-like process. These have to
be excluded since both would guarantee that adaptive new features occur without the
help of selection, i.e. without weeding out errors. From this point of view, the only
thing that is required is that variation is unjustified in Campbell’s sense, unjustified by
origin. Unjustified variation necessitates selection of a hypothesis, and thus justifies
the analogy between creativity and biological evolution.
3.1.1 The exclusion of foresight in a narrow sense
Popper said that for any given problem one cannot “anticipate its (unknown) solution
otherwise than by a fortunate accident” (Popper 1974a, p. 36). Campbell said: “Real
gains must have been the products of explorations going beyond the limits of foresight
or prescience, and in this sense blind” (Campbell 1960, p. 92; emph. added). Fore-
sight, in the narrow sense as Popper and Campbell assume it here, does not refer to
the ‘good guesses’ that are part of guided variation. It refers to real prescience.21 If we
take this into account, we can see that Popper and Campbell merely offer a conceptual
argument about creativity: real gains must have been ‘blind,’ by definition. If crea-
tivity is defined as going beyond what is already known, that is, defined as bringing
about something new (‘real gains’), then creativity excludes foresight, since foresight
is defined as knowing something already. As Plato stressed in his paradox of search
21 Mesoudi (2008) uses the term clairvoyance for prescience, stressing the importance of distinguishing
between clairvoyance on the one hand, and good guesses (what he calls foresight) on the other.
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in the Meno: if we know something, we cannot look for it since we know it already;
if we, however, do not know it, we cannot even look for it since we do not know what
we are looking for. That is why we cannot bring about something new by will and
foresight. The most curious thing about this specific aspect of the concept of creativity,
assumed by Popper and Campbell and quite widespread in philosophy of creativity,
is that a perfect God-like creator can thus not be creative, since a perfect being would
have foresight and could thus prevent errors. For a God-like creator there is no need
to be creative, so to say.22
But why should foresight in the narrow sense be so important?—Because, if we
had it, we could prevent errors, just as a God-like creator. Thus, the lack of foresight in
finding a creative solution means that the moment we come up with an idea, we do not
know whether the idea is worthwhile. This necessitates cognitive selection of thought
trials and is the basis for why Campbell calls the origin of new variants unjustified.
Creativity thus—by necessity—involves a selection process. Creativity does not how-
ever require by definition that we produce ideas in an undirected manner. Campbell’s
argument is supported not only by common sense, holding that we just make errors;
it is also supported by empirical research on bounded rationality and biased decision
making. We simply are not perfect: we make errors and are biased in many ways.23
But note that selection of hypotheses is a serial rather than a parallel mode of selec-
tion. Nature operates with parallel processing: many organisms function as simul-
taneous trials and the best variants increase in frequency due to selection. Human
minds are usually not engaged in such a kind of parallel processing. We do not breed
ideas in our minds that then increase their frequency so that many copies of an idea
float around in our minds. Even though we sometimes compare different ideas that
seem to be candidate solutions for one and the same given task, we usually develop
alternatives diachronically, one after another. Creativity is—as Nickles (2003, p. 63)
says—an instance of “serial evolution.” We have an idea and try it out. If it fails, we
consider another idea at hand, maybe even a previously rejected one, or we search for
a new alternative that is not yet at hand, and thus try another yet unwarranted idea,
until we reach a stable resting place. This procedure is evidently a selection process.
3.1.2 Exclusion of observationism
Popper is most prominent for stressing a further aspect of human creativity, creativity
as opposed to what he called observationism or psychological induction, which he
judges to be parallel to Lamarckism. As mentioned above, Lamarck explained local
adaptation through pointing to the moulding influence of the environment. Through
this influence an organism would be able to directly adapt to its environment. As
Lamarck conceived evolution, selection was not necessary for evolution, since each
organism was thought to interact with its environment directly and to reach ‘harmony’
through this interaction. According to Darwin, adaptive and non-adaptive features of
organism arise in a population and the good ones have to be selected, if evolution should
22 For more on the underlying concept of creativity see Kronfeldner (forthcoming).
23 Mesoudi (2008, pp. 249–252) summarizes the respective empirical research on rationality, discovery,
and decision-making relevant for this point.
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happen. After repeated selection over generations, this indirect ‘trial-and-error’ leads
to adaptations. Popper states an analogous contrast: hypothesis formation cannot be
reduced to gathering “‘direct knowledge’ of anything immediately ‘given”’; we are not
“passive recipients of information impressed upon us from outside” (Popper 1974b,
p. 116). Instead, we create ideas and select them afterwards. The hypotheses we build
on these ideas are—in Campbell’s words—‘unjustified,’ i.e. not guaranteed by origin
to be adaptive for the problems that we want to solve with them. Popper concludes:
“[W]e must abandon any approach which starts from sense data and the given, and
replace it by the assumption that all human knowledge is fallible and conjectural. It
is a product of the method of trial and error” (ibid.) Popper therefore stresses an old
contrast: learning by experience, i.e. learning by passively copying the environment,
is not creative. If creativity is defined as excluding copying from the environment,
then it holds that, if hypothesis formation is creative, it excludes—by definition—
observationism, a kind of psychological Lamarckism.24
What do (a), the exclusion of foresight (in the narrow sense), and (b), the exclu-
sion of psychological induction, show for the questions at issue here? They illustrate
that human hypothesis formation is neither analogous to a hypothetical God-like cre-
ation of hypotheses, with perfect knowledge and true foresight, nor analogous to a
Lamarckian direct adaptation to environment. However, this does not prove that it
is Darwinian in the narrow sense: Darwinian as biological evolution has turned out
to be, Darwinian as contemporary Darwinism in biology defines it, i.e. as requiring
undirected variation. Creative hypothesis formation is an instance of a coupled selec-
tive process and biological evolution is not. An evolutionary account of hypothesis
formation can thus not be called evolutionary in the same narrow sense as contempo-
rary Darwinism is called evolutionary. In other words, as long as biological evolution
rests on undirected variation, there is no strong analogy between creative hypothesis
formation and biological evolution.
But there is not only Darwinism in the narrow sense. As explicated in Part 1, Darwin-
ism in the wide sense does not necessarily require undirectedness, even if biological
evolution is still believed to fulfil this rather strong criterion. It merely requires that
selection is not superfluous. By pointing to the fact that creativity is—as biological
evolution—necessarily a selection process, we can thus restore the claim that there is
an analogy and reach a certain compatibility between the claim that creative hypoth-
esis formation is blind and the claim that it is guided: it is guided, but based on blind,
i.e. unjustified variation.25
Yet, even if we achieve compatibility of this sort, the price for it is a certain trivial-
ization of the claim. First of all, in no way does the claim that creativity is a selective
process explain creativity: it states that creativity excludes foresight and psychological
induction. However, this is not yet an explanation of the cognitive processes involved
in creativity. It merely excludes two kinds of explanation: (a) an explanation through
24 Popper was not the first who stated this contrast: The argument goes back to James (1880) who accused
Herbert Spencer of being a psychological Lamarckist.
25 This is in line with the consequences of the perspective that Hull et al. (2001) have defended by claiming
that it is not a direct analogy that is decisive for the comparison between creativity and biological evolution,
but a general account of selection processes.
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foresight, similar to explaining biological adaptations in a creationist way; (b) an
explanation through a reduction to direct information transmission from the environ-
ment, similar to explaining biological adaptations in a Lamarckian way. Second, the
claim that ideas can fail is much weaker than the claim that they are generated in an
undirected manner. Even though the critics’ claim (that creative hypothesis forma-
tion is guided) does not contain a full explanation either, it nonetheless says more
about creative hypothesis formation than the claim that it involves a selection pro-
cess—and so would the (false) claim that it is undirected. Compared to the latter, the
claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on unjustified variation has much
less explanatory force. Moving back to unjustified variation in face of the critique of
guided variation is thus answering a critique by trivializing the original claim. You
may secure the analogy with this strategy, but you lose most of the explanatory force
of the analogy.26
3.2 Bias compatibility
The second defence against the critique of guided variation, the bias compatibility
argument, states that the difference between the alleged decoupled selection pro-
cesses in biological evolution and the coupling in creativity is an illusion. According
to this, biological evolution also exhibits a bias that makes adaptive features more
likely. What happens in creativity is thought to be the same as what happens in bio-
logical evolution due to the effect of cumulative selection. Guidedness in creativity
should thus be explained as the perfectly Darwinian effect of cumulative previous
variation-selection cycles. Already Campbell (1974b, p. 151) reacted to the critique
of guided variation in this way by pointing to his nested hierarchy of vicarious selec-
tion processes. He claimed that there is a cascade of ontogenetic selection processes
(behavioural trial-and-error due to locomotion, internalised trial-and-error due to sen-
sory systems, trial-and-error at the level of ‘thought trials’). According to him, this
nesting, i.e. previous selection processes at the same or at vicarious levels, leads to the
guided variation critics described; but at least one of the vicarious processes was itself
blind. The products of previous selection stages then restrict further ‘thought trials’ in
the way critics claimed for creative hypothesis formation. This can be interpreted as
trying to restore the analogy by showing that there is a blind variation process some-
where in the hierarchy. Yet this cannot restore the claim that there is blindness at the
level of hypothesis formation and only this has been questioned by the argument from
guided variation.
Stein and Lipton (1989) further developed Campbell’s strategy of defence. They try
to neutralise what they call the “anomaly of guided variation” by stating that biolog-
ical evolution is not “truly blind” either, since it is constrained in various ways
26 Despite the explanatory weakness of the claim that creativity is a selection process, it might well have
had a heuristic value within the psychology of creativity. Whether it has had such a heuristic value can-
not be decided philosophically. Evidence for it could only be provided by detailed empirical case studies
on whether the ‘discovery’ of specific mechanisms (e.g. reduced latent inhibition or spreading activation,
postulated as helping to explain creativity) were encouraged by the idea that creativity is based on a
Darwinian selection process.
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(Stein and Lipton 1989, p. 43). They are not alone in claiming this. As mentioned,
Simonton (1999a, p. 62) claims that despite guided variation, there are “degrees of
blindness,” in biological evolution as well as in creativity. He combines this with the
thesis that the degree of blindness is dependent on how much the variation is restricted
by constraints that are the effect of previous trials.27
Stein and Lipton (1989) mainly refer to pre-adaptations; one of the examples
they use is the half-wing, acting as developmental constraint in biological evolu-
tion, enabling and constraining the subsequent evolution of the wing. Pre-adaptations
are taken to be analogous to previously acquired knowledge in hypothesis formation.
In both cases, the developmental constraints operative due to the pre-adaptations can
explain how the variation that is available for selection at a certain step of the overall
cumulative process can be biased towards certain variants. On this basis, Stein and
Lipton want to restore the claim that there is a strong similarity between creativity
and biological evolution, a similarity that entails more than the claim that both are
selective processes. According to them, both exhibit a bias that can be explained in
the same way—through the effect of developmental constraints operative in biolog-
ical or epistemic pre-adaptations. Guided variation can then be explained (and thus
accommodated) as a standard Darwinian effect of cumulativity.
Their argument rests on a simple but central error. They ignore that developmental
constraints have to be distinguished from coupling: the former is an effect of previous
cycles of variation and selection and the latter an effect of the current selective environ-
ment of a respective type of entity whose evolution is at issue. The bias compatibility
argument says that—despite guided variation—creativity is analogous to biological
evolution, since in both cases there is a bias in variation that can be explained as the
standard effect of previous cycles of variation and selection. On the one hand, this
is true; on the other hand, it is not. The question is whether creativity is, first, an
instance of coupling (and therefore not similar to biological evolution), or whether it
is, second, an instance of a cultural analogue of developmental constraints. Now, the
problem is that creativity is both at the same time. The knowledge, i.e. the selective
environment, that causes coupling between variation and selection, is the knowledge
that is the effect of previous cognitive selection. These effects are ‘pre-adaptations’
that restrict future developments. They certainly do this through a cultural analogue
to developmental constraints: knowledge and cognitive heuristics, as well as certain
standards of a domain (epistemic virtues like testability in science, aesthetic virtues in
the arts, for instance).28 Now, the essential difference between creativity and biologi-
cal evolution is that in creativity the present selective environment contains the effects
of previous selection. This is not necessarily the case for biological evolution. The tree
in the selective environment of a giraffe is not an effect of previous selection rounds of
27 Compare Simonton (1988, pp. 4–5, 1995, pp. 473–474, 1999b, p. 311, 2003, pp. 316–317, 2005, pp. 300–
301), (Nickles, 2003, pp. 65–66), Buskes (1998, pp. 115–123), or Simon (1981, pp. 205–206), who also
used a ‘selectionist’ analogy, but without relying on, or explicitly denying undirected variation. Mesoudi
(2008) has put forward the so-far most extended and up-to-date version of such a bias compatibility argu-
ment, mixed with a selectionist compatibility argument. He addresses the impact of guided variation for
population-level cultural selection processes and forms thus a complement to this paper, which focuses on
the individual level of creativity.
28 For more on the analogous effects of ‘developmental constraints’ in culture see Wimsatt (1999).
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the giraffe as a type. Yet, our previously acquired knowledge (comparable to the tree)
is indeed the effect of previous selections of the body of belief, whose evolution is at
issue (analogous to the giraffe). Owing to this difference, developmental constraints
and coupled evolution are hard to distinguish in creativity and easy to distinguish in
biological evolution.
Since creativity contains developmental constraints and coupling at the same time,
critics and defenders are both right. The bias compatibility argument is however still ill
founded. Stein and Lipton state that coupling is no argument against a strong similarity,
since the bias in creativity can be explained as being analogous to developmental con-
straints. Therefore, they state, “we do not need the coupling of variation and selection”
to explain guided variation (Stein and Lipton 1989, p. 53). We do not need coupling
to explain the presence of the knowledge that acts as current selective environment;
this is explained by cumulativity. But we need coupling in order to explain how the
knowledge that is the effect of previous selection leads to guided variation: how it
causes the bias in variation. Stein and Lipton overlook this precisely because they fail
to differentiate consistently between developmental constraints and coupling. This is
the central error in the bias compatibility argument.
In conclusion, Stein and Lipton mistakenly explain a factual instance of coupling as
merely analogous to the effects of cumulativity in biological evolution. They ignore the
fact that biological evolution is an instance of decoupled cumulative evolution, while
creativity is a special case of coupled cumulative evolution. The bias compatibility
argument fails.
3.3 Hidden chaos compatibility
There is one chance left to answer the critique of guided variation. The hidden chaos
compatibility argument states that the apparent guidedness of creativity is based on an
unconscious, i.e. hidden chaos. This argument has been defended most prominently
by the creativity psychologist Dean K. Simonton in his “chance-configuration the-
ory” (1988, 1995) and goes back to Poincaré’s (1908) theory of unconscious idea
formation.29
Neither Poincaré nor Simonton deny that the previously acquired knowledge leads
to coupling, i.e. that it can constrain the production of thought trials in the way we
described it above for Kekulé. What they deny instead is that this contradicts the thesis
that there is an unconscious process of truly ‘blind’ variation as part of the overall pro-
cess that is guided by selective criteria, which represent already acquired knowledge.
Previously acquired knowledge might, for instance, influence which elements of ideas
enter the unconscious process in order to get reshuffled and newly combined, while the
combinations themselves are formed blindly, as Poincaré (1908, pp. 393–394) puts it.
It is unclear whether Poincaré and Simonton demand that the unconsciously pro-
duced “chance-configurations” are really produced at random or in an undirected
29 The argument is implicit already in Campbell (1960, 1974a,b). I will use the term “hidden chaos” from
Stein and Lipton (1989, p. 38), who also defend such a compatibility. Nonetheless, in this case, I will
concentrate on Simonton’s more detailed version.
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manner. What Simonton, for instance, explicitly demands is that a “large number
of potential permutations exist, all with comparably low but nonzero probability”
(Simonton 1988, p. 7). Be it as it may, we can assume that the unconscious selection
process is based on many variants, or on variants that are generated in an undirected
manner, or even in a random manner. In all these cases, the problem is the same: the
empirical evidence for such a claim about an unconsciously produced waste of ideas,
ideas that never come to consciousness, is hard to get.
Poincaré himself admitted that he could not cite evidence for his account; he admit-
ted that it is only a hypothesis. Campbell (1960,108f) conceded that his model of crea-
tivity as blind variation is still not an explanatory psychological theory, since it would
have to prove and specify the exact cognitive mechanisms involved in creativity. But
this was in the 1960s and psychology of creativity has come a long way since then. It
is Simonton who claimed that in light of the current developments in psychology of
creativity Poincaré’s model turns out to be the correct explanation of creativity. Other
creativity theorists resist this claim and state that there is no unambiguous evidence
for a special process of unconscious trial-and-error.
According to the cognitive approaches to creativity mentioned in Part 2, crea-
tivity can be reduced to the complex interaction of a group of cognitive processes,
most of which are operative in all kinds of reasoning, not only in creative rea-
soning. At the same time there is abundant evidence that creativity involves what
psychologists call instantaneous insight: ideas occur so suddenly that it feels as if
they are not produced at will. The reports of such sudden insights, from Archimedes
‘Eureka’ to Kekulé, Poincaré, Einstein, or Watson and Crick, still fill contemporary
books on creativity, be they historically or psychologically minded. Insight can thus
count as a phenomenological datum of creativity research. It usually occurs after two
loosely defined stages of the overall creative process, a preparation stage and a break
called incubation stage. The special process of unconscious variation-and-selection
is thought to provide an explanation for insight and for what happens during incu-
bation. Yet, in addition to the unconscious variation-and-selection hypothesis there
are other common hypotheses about insight, as Seifert et al. (1995) stress. One of
the alternatives is the opportunistic-assimilation hypothesis. It states that it is not
incubation itself and a hypothetical unconscious hidden chaos, but the assimilation
of serendipitous, i.e. coincidental clues that explains sudden insight phenomena. By
a series of careful experiments, Seifert et al. (1995) show that insight is not more
likely to occur just by extending or shortening the incubation stage, which is the
supposed time when the hidden chaos is thought to form itself. On the contrary,
they showed that insight is only then considerably more likely to occur, when an
impasse is reached during preparation and when the individual has then the chance
to be influenced by coincidental clues during incubation. The increased probability,
which occured when an impasse was reached and coincidental clues were available,
was not predicted and cannot be explained by the unconscious variation-and-selec-
tion hypothesis. In other words, the predictions derived from an unconscious var-
iation-and-selection hypothesis were not confirmed, whereas the predictions of the
opportunistic-assimilation hypothesis were. Even though this does not prove that
no hidden chaos occurs, it does support the claim that the process of opportunistic
assimilation (of accommodating coincidental new information to a given structured
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problem space) is essential. And, as mentioned in Part 2, opportunistic assimilation
itself is a mechanism far from being random or undirected.
The evidence for the hidden chaos model that Simonton (1999a,b) offers from his
own research is historiometric. The problem is that although this evidence is indeed
consistent with the hidden chaos theory, as Simonton (1999b, p. 316) has claimed, it
is also consistent with alternative approaches that do not rely on a hidden chaos. Let
me concentrate on the most striking issue. Simonton has cited his own historiometric
evidence for the “equal-odds rule,” which shows, for instance, that the expected prob-
ability of career success remains constant within a career, regardless of the creator’s
age and increase in accumulated knowledge. In other words, the proportion of hits
(defined quantitatively via citation statistics) stays the same, even if more previously
acquired knowledge constrains the psychological make-up of a person.
Whatever the value of the historiometric data is, the data cannot provide evidence
for a special subconscious process of variation-and-selection. The historiometric evi-
dence is too indirect to be conclusive in that respect. First of all, it measures how
often we succeed according to quantitative criteria. It does not explain how a person
comes up with those ideas that this person judges himself as worthwhile, which may
well include the successful and the unsuccessful ones. Second, the random pattern
is compatible with the alternative explanation of insight mentioned above. It might
well be that the proportion of Kekulé’s successful ideas did not increase over his
career and that Kekulé produced his idea of the benzene ring the way the alternative
non-evolutionary model suggests, namely with the help of opportunistic assimilation
and normal cognitive processes such as memory, perception, abstraction etc., working
in a highly efficient manner and at the moment of insight at quite a high speed, and
some of them, like perception, on auto-pilot (i.e. not consciously monitored). Third,
the historiometric model aggregates data over a variety of contexts, a procedure that
might well lead to a random pattern merely because of the aggregation. The complex
interaction of cognitive processes and social processes in these contexts alone lets us
“expect the resulting data to fit a random model,” irrespective of any assumptions about
the cognitive processes involved, as the psychologist Mumford (1999, p. 344) argued.
Thus, the historiometric evidence is consistent with and predictable from models that
do not assume that there is a special process of unconscious trial-and-error.30
Finally, it should be noted that Simonton (e.g. 1999b, p. 312) also refers to experi-
mental evidence to defend his Darwinian account of creativity, for instance, to oppor-
tunistic assimilation. Yet this has been formulated as an explicit alternative to the
chance-configuration mechanism. Opportunistic-assimilation can only support unjus-
tified variation, i.e. selectionist compatibility, but not a hidden chaos.
As long as there is no conclusive experimental evidence for an unconscious pro-
duction of a ‘hidden chaos,’ selectionist compatibility is the only resting place for
creativity as a Darwinian process.
30 For a critique of non-aggregative historiometric evidence provided by Simonton (2007a), derived from
a single case, see Mumford and Antes (2007).
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3.4 Moving back to selectionist compatibility
This argument is supported by a more sweeping look on Simonton’s work over
the years, since it seems that it is this weaker analogy to which Simonton actually
committed himself, an analogy to which he explicitly moved back to in his later
papers, withdrawing from the claim that creativity is based on the chance-configuration
mechanism. The chance-configuration mechanism is then treated as but one of many
mechanisms that could account for the selective process (Simonton 1999a,b, 2003,
2007b). In Simonton’s own words, the stress of ‘blindness’ of variation in creativity
only denotes “the lack of foresight in the production of variations—the inability to
generate purposively the most adaptive variations. […] The term blindness also has
the advantage of not committing the theory to any particular variation mechanism”
(Simonton 1999b, p. 310; emph. added). The evidence offered in the same paper, and
discussed above, would then have to be interpreted as evidence for the weaker claim
that creativity is a selection process. Yet, nobody disagrees with this claim. In the
context of contemporary psychological explanations of creativity, this weaker claim
becomes superfluous, precisely because, as Simonton himself says, it is compatible
with many of the diverse mechanisms that are suggested by psychology of creativity as
playing a role in creative achievements and which are not in any sense ‘blind’ or ‘evo-
lutionary.’ This compatibility with diverse cognitive mechanisms further corroborates
the claim that the selectionist claim itself does not contribute much to an explanation
of creativity (see above 3.3).
In 2005 then, Simonton (2005, p. 307) decided to “drop the explicit BVSR model
and its Darwinian theoretical foundations,” and to explain “creativity in terms of ‘com-
binatorial models that treat the phenomenon as a ‘constrained stochastic process’.”
The systematic analysis offered here makes clear why he had to do so: because of the
compatibility of unjustified variation with diverse cognitive mechanisms, it becomes
superfluous to call the mechanisms themselves ‘blind’ or ‘Darwinian’ despite their
myriad differences at the cognitive level.31 Last but not least, his final withdrawal
illustrates that unjustified variation is all we can safely postulate for creativity. Unfor-
tunately, the latter is only implicitly admitted by Simonton, who goes on to use the
term ‘blind’ in all three meanings of random, undirected, and unjustified variation,
and does so interchangeable, without clearly distinguishing between them.
4 Conclusion
Let me collate the results: There are three quite distinct meanings of blind variation,
i.e. unjustified, undirected, and random variation. The critique of guided variation
attacks undirected variation and claims that guidedness shows a disanalogy between
biological evolution and hypothesis formation. There are three strategies of defence,
three compatibility arguments. The selectionist compatibility argument states that
a bias within variation is compatible with the Darwinian view of evolution as a
31 Simonton (2005) gives ideological reasons for his withdrawal: given that Darwinism is for many an
ideologically suspicious thing, it is wise not to use the language.
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selective process; the bias compatibility argument states that the guidedness in cre-
ativity is analogous to developmental constraints in biological evolution; the hidden
chaos compatibility argument states that the apparent guidedness of creative hypoth-
esis formation is based on a hidden, unconscious blind variation process.
Each compatibility argument has considerable problems: the selectionist compati-
bility claim holds but trivializes the original claim, the bias compatibility claim rests
on the simple but central error of confusing coupling of variation and selection with
developmental constraints, and the hidden chaos compatibility claim lacks evidence
from psychology of creativity.
Since selectionist compatibility is the only compatibility that holds, let me end
by summarizing the trivialization inherent in it. The kind of blind variation that can
be defended (i.e. unjustified variation) is compatible with guided variation and with
diverse cognitive processes. Two basic consequences derive from each of these two
compatibilities, one about the descriptive and one about the explanatory force of the
analogy between creative hypothesis formation and biological evolution. Because of
the first compatibility (i.e. selectionist compatibility), the analogy has some descriptive
adequacy, but not very much, since the critics’ point still holds: creative hypothesis
formation exhibits coupling, while biological evolution does not, given the current con-
sensu in biology. Because of the second compatibility (i.e. compatibility with diverse
cognitive processes), moving back to the thesis that creativity involves good guesses
(i.e. unjustified leaps into the unknown followed by cognitive selection) leads to the
loss of almost all the explanatory force of the analogy. Although unjustified varia-
tion excludes certain explanations (i.e. a God-like formation of ideas with foresight
and an observationist account of idea formation), it does not itself offer an explana-
tion of creativity, which would have to be given at the level of the diverse cognitive
processes. It is the compatibility or non-commitment with respect to cognitive mecha-
nisms that actually destroys almost all of the explanatory force of the claim that should
be defended.
Blind variation as unjustified variation transferred back to biological evolution sim-
ply means that the process is a selection process. This meaning is part of any theory
that can rightfully be called Darwinian and is fulfilled by creative hypothesis formation
as well as biological evolution. But since creative hypothesis formation is not based
on undirected variation, one has to be careful not to assume more than that. Since
selectionist compatibility is a rather weak claim, and since all parties to the debate
actually take guided variation for granted, large parts of the debate should be regarded
as ‘much ado about nothing’. We can choose to call creativity a Darwinian selection
process, but if we refrain from doing so, we do not lose anything from our understand-
ing of creativity, at least nothing that we did not know already or independently of any
Darwinian framework, namely that we are simply not perfect and make lots of errors.
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